Войти
Регистрация
http://www.marketwat.....E836AF1D7EC6}
Almaty Stock Madness IIбиржевой симулятор
Автор [Narim], 29.07.2005, 17:50
Наверх
#422
Отправлено 14.01.2006, 00:37:36
Pooh
-
- В доску свой
- 1 898 сообщений
Go Chipotle go!
---------
Предсказания на 2006 от Крамера: http://www.newyorkme...5455/index.html
GM will be bankrupt, C will merge with GS, Murdoch will buy WSJ, etc.
#423
Отправлено 17.01.2006, 01:26:35
Pooh
-
- В доску свой
- 1 898 сообщений
Вах, какая хорошая лекция: http://www.vinvestin...columns/onghai/
Полный текст постю потому что vinvesting.com немного барахлит иногда, и чтобы понравившееся выделить.
:
--------------
Marty Whitman Speech at AAII-NYC
Transcript of Notes from Marty Whitman?s Meeting Jan. 11, 2006 with NYC Chapter of AAII by Mike Onghai, CFA and Judy Onghai, PhD.
Marty Whitman, Chairman and Founder of Third Avenue Value Funds, Professor at Yale University, Author of ?Aggressive Conservative Investor? and ?Value Investing: A Balanced Approach?.
Good Evening, It?s so nice to be here. By way of background, last year Wiley had asked me to update my 1979 book, The Aggressive Conservative Investor. A couple of things came to my mind. First I went to mutual fund business in 1984. From 1984 to April 2005, Third Avenue has compounded at 17% annual returns. The returns were lumpy. Being buy-and-hold, [there are] some years we did not do as well as the indices. But most of the time, we far outpaced them and certainly have done well over the long term. The most amazing thing I have found during the update: There has been a revolution of investor disclosure. It is infinitely easier to do today than in 1979. There are non-GAAP disclosures, safe harbor, better delivery systems, etc. In 1979, I had to take the subway down to the Federal Building, to the SEC to look at the microfiche.
Let me tonight first talk about what we do in common stocks and what's wrong with it. If there is time, I will talk about distressed investing, which is simply a creditor business, for us anyway. We don't get involved in common stocks of distressed companies.
So what do we do in common stocks ? the ?safe and cheap? method? By safe and cheap, it has nothing to do with fluctuation of stock prices, but everything to do with whether a business is solid or not.
What is safe?
1) Super strong financial position, which is represented by three things. a) Relative absence of liabilities - on balance sheet, disclosed in footnotes, or real world. We never did anything with tobacco stocks. In the history of Third Avenue, we virtually had no investments in old line manufacturing companies. After being investors in John Mansville credits, there is no way we would want to be junior to asbestos liabilities. There is no old line manufacturing company I know of that does not have asbestos liability. b) Presence of very high quality assets. Unlike Graham and Dodd, who defined high quality assets by looking at classified balance sheets, we don't pay attention for classified balance sheets. For example, we have huge investments in real estate, which may be classified as fixed asset we know we can sell class A buildings with long-term creditworthy tenants easily by picking up a phone call. c.) Businesses with free cash flows available to common stockholders. Now that happens far more rarely than most people think. Everybody talks about cash flows. The vast majority have earnings, not cash flow. I define earnings as creating wealth while consuming cash. (Pooh: ??) If you have earnings while consuming cash, sooner or later, you've got to have access to capital markets. Anyway, we look very closely at that. As an aside, we have large investments in mutual fund management companies -- great businesses that are licenses to steal [laughter], better than the toll bridge on George Washington Bridge. They are prosperous ? no credit risk, no inventory, no fixed asssets, no liabilities.
2) Management competence. We look for management who are reasonably competent and cognizant of the interests of the outside passive minority investors such as ourselves. Every relationship is a combination of conflicts of interests, and community of interests. On our screw ups, we've screwed up in appraisal of management more than anything else. I am generally so pleased with management of our portfolio of investments. I believe Warren Buffett's genius is judging people.
3) Understandable. We invest only in businesses we understand. Full documentary disclosure, audited financials, preferably by the Big Four. If we can't understand the disclosure statements, forget about the business. We never got involved with Enron. I looked at it, and I couldn?t figure it out [laughter] ?
What do I mean by cheap?
Cheap means it is reasonably priced no more than 50 or 60 cents on the dollar for what this business would be worth to a private company or a takeover candidate. This is easier than you would think because we are so conscious of the balance sheet, and we place no primacy of the income statement. Over 80% of our portfolio companies were acquired at a substantial discount to readily ascertainable net asset values. This is not rocket science. A lot of real estate, marketable securities, Mutual fund management companies which can be bought at intrinsic values of 3 to 4 % of assets. Toyota Industries is our way of buying Toyota Motors at a meaningful discount. To date, it has been a good way to play the auto industry.
Having said all that, what's wrong with what we are doing?
There?s a lot wrong. We have to read a lot of documents. [laughter].
1) In order to get these opportunities, most often, the near term outlook sucks. That has been our biggest problem. Of late, to get "safe and cheap", especially cheap, we've gone overseas - Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Sweden and Switzerland. There is a real risk of investing in issues even though they are blue chips, are audited by the Big Five, investing in jurisdiction where you don't get protection from the U.S. law. I'd think foreign issuers approach 50 percent of our portfolio. A way to put it is, they are more cheap, but less safe. Because of Sarbanes Oxley, no foreign issuer like Toyota Industries will subject to our jurisdiction unless they really need our capital. I think Sarbanes Oxley is screwing up our capital markets for foreign issuers and small issuers. [There is] one thing to mention about foreign investment. When you are used to American culture, it is a lot easier to invest here. [But we are bottom-up.] Countries pick us, we don't pick them.
2) Management with whom we are in bed are just as conservative or even more conservative than we are. They'll sacrifice ROI, or ROE for the safety of the balance sheet. They are non-promotional people who don't need Wall Street. They don't care. One of the things I found with having reasonable management is that, the strong financial position allows them to be opportunistic. This ability has probably accounted for our 10 baggers more than anything else.
3) The so-called take under phenomenon. What we do is similar to what takeover guys do. We get a lot of "going privates", insider mergers. We don't turnover much, most of our positions were exited via take over. By the way, almost no business is a strict going concern. If you take a 5 year view, there are resource conversions, spin-offs, liquidations.
4) Roach Motel. We don't pay much attention to marketability and liquidity. We are subject to the roach motel. When we make mistakes as we do, we are subject to the ?roach motel? problem -- easy to check in, but can't check out (laughter). Our returns are lumpy. We try to avoid investment risk. We pay no attention to market risk. If I recommend something, it soon goes down 20 percent.
Distressed Investing
Distressed is a creditor business. Unlike most of the rest of the world, there is chapter 11 in the U.S. which allows us to rehabilitate, and reorganize businesses. There are 3 sides to this business.
1) I don't do distress unless at least 500 basis points measured against comparable credit. One of the things we try to do is to buy 50% or more of senior debt of troubled companies at 15 to 20% yield to maturity.
2) We do get involved in reorganization of larger companies. We're very interested in General Motors now. Can't see how it is not reorganizable.
3) Buy issues that will never miss a payment. GMAC, CIT when it was controlled by Tyco. We have made huge amount of money in distressed - Nabors, Public Service of New Hampshire, but our strike out ratio has been big. It's much like venture capital.
Полный текст постю потому что vinvesting.com немного барахлит иногда, и чтобы понравившееся выделить.
:--------------
Marty Whitman Speech at AAII-NYC
Transcript of Notes from Marty Whitman?s Meeting Jan. 11, 2006 with NYC Chapter of AAII by Mike Onghai, CFA and Judy Onghai, PhD.
Marty Whitman, Chairman and Founder of Third Avenue Value Funds, Professor at Yale University, Author of ?Aggressive Conservative Investor? and ?Value Investing: A Balanced Approach?.
Good Evening, It?s so nice to be here. By way of background, last year Wiley had asked me to update my 1979 book, The Aggressive Conservative Investor. A couple of things came to my mind. First I went to mutual fund business in 1984. From 1984 to April 2005, Third Avenue has compounded at 17% annual returns. The returns were lumpy. Being buy-and-hold, [there are] some years we did not do as well as the indices. But most of the time, we far outpaced them and certainly have done well over the long term. The most amazing thing I have found during the update: There has been a revolution of investor disclosure. It is infinitely easier to do today than in 1979. There are non-GAAP disclosures, safe harbor, better delivery systems, etc. In 1979, I had to take the subway down to the Federal Building, to the SEC to look at the microfiche.
Let me tonight first talk about what we do in common stocks and what's wrong with it. If there is time, I will talk about distressed investing, which is simply a creditor business, for us anyway. We don't get involved in common stocks of distressed companies.
So what do we do in common stocks ? the ?safe and cheap? method? By safe and cheap, it has nothing to do with fluctuation of stock prices, but everything to do with whether a business is solid or not.
What is safe?
1) Super strong financial position, which is represented by three things. a) Relative absence of liabilities - on balance sheet, disclosed in footnotes, or real world. We never did anything with tobacco stocks. In the history of Third Avenue, we virtually had no investments in old line manufacturing companies. After being investors in John Mansville credits, there is no way we would want to be junior to asbestos liabilities. There is no old line manufacturing company I know of that does not have asbestos liability. b) Presence of very high quality assets. Unlike Graham and Dodd, who defined high quality assets by looking at classified balance sheets, we don't pay attention for classified balance sheets. For example, we have huge investments in real estate, which may be classified as fixed asset we know we can sell class A buildings with long-term creditworthy tenants easily by picking up a phone call. c.) Businesses with free cash flows available to common stockholders. Now that happens far more rarely than most people think. Everybody talks about cash flows. The vast majority have earnings, not cash flow. I define earnings as creating wealth while consuming cash. (Pooh: ??) If you have earnings while consuming cash, sooner or later, you've got to have access to capital markets. Anyway, we look very closely at that. As an aside, we have large investments in mutual fund management companies -- great businesses that are licenses to steal [laughter], better than the toll bridge on George Washington Bridge. They are prosperous ? no credit risk, no inventory, no fixed asssets, no liabilities.
2) Management competence. We look for management who are reasonably competent and cognizant of the interests of the outside passive minority investors such as ourselves. Every relationship is a combination of conflicts of interests, and community of interests. On our screw ups, we've screwed up in appraisal of management more than anything else. I am generally so pleased with management of our portfolio of investments. I believe Warren Buffett's genius is judging people.
3) Understandable. We invest only in businesses we understand. Full documentary disclosure, audited financials, preferably by the Big Four. If we can't understand the disclosure statements, forget about the business. We never got involved with Enron. I looked at it, and I couldn?t figure it out [laughter] ?
What do I mean by cheap?
Cheap means it is reasonably priced no more than 50 or 60 cents on the dollar for what this business would be worth to a private company or a takeover candidate. This is easier than you would think because we are so conscious of the balance sheet, and we place no primacy of the income statement. Over 80% of our portfolio companies were acquired at a substantial discount to readily ascertainable net asset values. This is not rocket science. A lot of real estate, marketable securities, Mutual fund management companies which can be bought at intrinsic values of 3 to 4 % of assets. Toyota Industries is our way of buying Toyota Motors at a meaningful discount. To date, it has been a good way to play the auto industry.
Having said all that, what's wrong with what we are doing?
There?s a lot wrong. We have to read a lot of documents. [laughter].
1) In order to get these opportunities, most often, the near term outlook sucks. That has been our biggest problem. Of late, to get "safe and cheap", especially cheap, we've gone overseas - Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Sweden and Switzerland. There is a real risk of investing in issues even though they are blue chips, are audited by the Big Five, investing in jurisdiction where you don't get protection from the U.S. law. I'd think foreign issuers approach 50 percent of our portfolio. A way to put it is, they are more cheap, but less safe. Because of Sarbanes Oxley, no foreign issuer like Toyota Industries will subject to our jurisdiction unless they really need our capital. I think Sarbanes Oxley is screwing up our capital markets for foreign issuers and small issuers. [There is] one thing to mention about foreign investment. When you are used to American culture, it is a lot easier to invest here. [But we are bottom-up.] Countries pick us, we don't pick them.
2) Management with whom we are in bed are just as conservative or even more conservative than we are. They'll sacrifice ROI, or ROE for the safety of the balance sheet. They are non-promotional people who don't need Wall Street. They don't care. One of the things I found with having reasonable management is that, the strong financial position allows them to be opportunistic. This ability has probably accounted for our 10 baggers more than anything else.
3) The so-called take under phenomenon. What we do is similar to what takeover guys do. We get a lot of "going privates", insider mergers. We don't turnover much, most of our positions were exited via take over. By the way, almost no business is a strict going concern. If you take a 5 year view, there are resource conversions, spin-offs, liquidations.
4) Roach Motel. We don't pay much attention to marketability and liquidity. We are subject to the roach motel. When we make mistakes as we do, we are subject to the ?roach motel? problem -- easy to check in, but can't check out (laughter). Our returns are lumpy. We try to avoid investment risk. We pay no attention to market risk. If I recommend something, it soon goes down 20 percent.
Distressed Investing
Distressed is a creditor business. Unlike most of the rest of the world, there is chapter 11 in the U.S. which allows us to rehabilitate, and reorganize businesses. There are 3 sides to this business.
1) I don't do distress unless at least 500 basis points measured against comparable credit. One of the things we try to do is to buy 50% or more of senior debt of troubled companies at 15 to 20% yield to maturity.
2) We do get involved in reorganization of larger companies. We're very interested in General Motors now. Can't see how it is not reorganizable.
3) Buy issues that will never miss a payment. GMAC, CIT when it was controlled by Tyco. We have made huge amount of money in distressed - Nabors, Public Service of New Hampshire, but our strike out ratio has been big. It's much like venture capital.
#424
Отправлено 17.01.2006, 01:33:40
Pooh
-
- В доску свой
- 1 898 сообщений
А вопросы-ответы вообще рулят:
Q: What are your current thoughts about St. Joe?
A: We've been buying it. We like it. You bring up a good point. This whole [safe and cheap] discipline works a lot better on the buying [decision]. We don't sell unless it is grossly overvalued. I?ve spent a lot of time where I sold a stock which tripled in 3 years to somebody, who then tripled his return in six months.
(laughter)
Q: There seems to be a rotation to growth stocks. How do you view this? What baloney. By growth [you mean] generally recognized growth, or the willingness to pay up. Are you going to tell me that Toyota Industries and St. Joe have no growth? It just means are you willing to pay up ? [applause]
Q: Greater disclosure seems to make it easier for everybody. Does it make it more difficult for one person to outperform the market?
A: [Different people treat information differently.] Traders have information. College professors don't have a clue it exists. Asset allocators don't read anything. I was at a panel one time at Stanford Graduate School, with a Nobel prize winner ? a typical academic. He said, ?I'm very smart. I have a PhD. I have a Nobel Prize. If I don't know anything, how can anybody else know anything?? He never read anything. He never had a course in accounting. I would say the vast majority of people in the common stock business do not read documents.
Q: You said you do not take market risk. In a distressed business, can it[the company] run out of oxygen?
A: Very rarely. You have the case of Winstar, which run out of administrative expenses (Ed. Note: Winstar eventually got bought out by IDT for about one penny on the dollar) In most cases, the bank debts are reinstated, the junior debts are converted into equity and the old common stockholders will be wiped out. Sometimes, they go bankrupt again. It's called Chapter 22. We have a high strikeout ratio. It's not easy.
Q: Do you have any value buys recently?
A: We bought 2 million shares of Pfizer at 21. It's at 10 times P/E for a business that normally sells for 20 times. But we did not buy Merck because of the potential liabilities.
Q: Why do you have four funds, instead of just one?
A: We are investor oriented. Reason we have it is to track 3 managers besides myself. Mike Winer knows 10x about real estate as I do. Reason we have it is management. We have attracted the managers to run these funds.
Q: Did you say General Motors will go bankrupt?
A: Let me go through General Motors. I cannot see how they can solve problems outside of Chapter 11. They must unload pension plans, contracts, etc. There is some 30 billion of public debt. It?s very hard to see how they can get the bondholders to do a voluntary exchange. The reason: you have to show the bondholder some downside if he does not exchange. The bonds all have equitable and ratable clauses. I really don?t see how they can solve outside Chapter 11. But I want to add something else. For a company as big as GM with so many profitable businesses [segments], there will be recognizable pressure to preserve value for some of the equity. I have been known to be wrong. [laughter]
Q: I am a value investor and I own Berkshire Hathaway. I have yet to meet a value investor who thinks gold stocks are plays of any kind. What is your view of gold stocks?
A: I plead ignorance.
Q: Which funds are closed?
A: Real Estate and International are closed because we can't find opportunities to deploy the cash. Otherwise, we would open it. I mean we are a profitable business as I told you. [laughter]. In money management, bigger is always better, but my family and I have over 100 million in the funds. Between managing the funds as well as we can and raising fees, where do you think my heart is? If we find opportunities, we?ll open them again.
Q: Have you considered shorting? We have private accounts that short.
A: I don't. In shorts, you have to be cognizant of market risks. A few years ago, we had a scheme to short par bonds which were selling above the call price. The downside would be limited. Can you believe it? I cannot pull the trigger with my own money.
Q: Can you recommend ways on how to appraise management?
A: Read documents, study the compensation, options, financial statements, etc. Depreciation methods, etc. You look at 10-k, 10-q, 8-k, annual reports, president's
letter, quarterly letters.
Q: Can you comment on GMAC?
A: I'm not going to say guarantees. We've been buying GMACs at 10-11% yield. I will say, You're never going to miss a payment. When GM files, GM creditors will make a claim for substantive consolidation. I think only 1 in 100 chance such a claim will be sustained. We are also principal creditors of USG [where this substantive consolidation issue was brought up during the asbestos issues]. I think the same will happen with GMAC. I feel strongly about it.
Q: What are some of the values abroad?
A: Recent purchases were: Cheung Kong Holding, the controlling shareholder of Hutchison Whampoa, Henderson Land, Guoco Group, Posco Steel, Investor AB in Sweden.
Q: Do you look at any telecom stocks?
A: We may invest in equipment manufacturers, having done nothing lately. Carriers scare me. My investments in high tech in general with cash positions exceeding all liabilities, is less than 2x book, less than 10x peak earnings. Our record at best has been mediocre. Like a first stage venture capitalist, we have a big strike out ratio.
Q: Why don?t you start a bond fund? TAV does bonds.
A: When we do distress, we want to be a control investor. TAV can put 1 billion in GM for example. I don't think we'll have ability to raise that kind of money, outside of TAV, for a bond fund. And we have no interest in being a market player, my head will be handed to me. It?s a very confrontational business.
Q: Is there such a thing as too big to fail ? Lockheed, Chrysler?
A: I think there is such a thing as too big to be liquidated, but not too big to be reorganized. In the past, cases like Public Service of New Hampshire or Chrysler, the common idea was if they went bankrupt, they would turn off the lights, or they would stop operating. People are now discovering that's not the case. ?Too big not to be reorganized.? ? that?s what I think, anyway.
Q: Do you and your managers agree within 10% of [intrinsic] value?
A: I doubt it. (Pooh: ??)
Q: The NAV of Third Avenue Value Fund dropped from 60 to 50. What happened?
A: We went ex-dividend. We were involved with Eddie Lampert in the reorganization of Kmart. We had a cost basis of 10 in Kmart which went up to the 160s. We sold not because I don't have a lot of confidence in Eddie, but at 164, will Kmart beat Walmart and Target? I am not so sure. One of the disadvantages with foreign issuers, things like Toyota Industries, Investor AB, etc to U.S. taxpayers. They are PFICs (Passive Foreign Investment Companies), taxed each year as ordinary income on the unrealized appreciation. That was really tax inefficient.
Q: Where is the market going?
A: I don't have a clue. We're market neutral. Most people are very worried about the economy. They are living in 1930s, not the 21st century. Virtually every American Industry has gone through depression almost as bad as the depression: real estate, steel, banks, paper, etc . It has been 50 years now, without domino effect. It changed since 1930s. I suspect to continue, so worry about bottom up, not the stock market, etc.
Q: Others have said Eddie Lampert is the next Warren Buffett ?
A: I will sign off on that. He?s very talented. Now, nobody's perfect. Even Warren did USAir. But Eddie?s certainly done a wonderful job so far.
Q: What are your current thoughts about St. Joe?
A: We've been buying it. We like it. You bring up a good point. This whole [safe and cheap] discipline works a lot better on the buying [decision]. We don't sell unless it is grossly overvalued. I?ve spent a lot of time where I sold a stock which tripled in 3 years to somebody, who then tripled his return in six months.
(laughter)
Q: There seems to be a rotation to growth stocks. How do you view this? What baloney. By growth [you mean] generally recognized growth, or the willingness to pay up. Are you going to tell me that Toyota Industries and St. Joe have no growth? It just means are you willing to pay up ? [applause]
Q: Greater disclosure seems to make it easier for everybody. Does it make it more difficult for one person to outperform the market?
A: [Different people treat information differently.] Traders have information. College professors don't have a clue it exists. Asset allocators don't read anything. I was at a panel one time at Stanford Graduate School, with a Nobel prize winner ? a typical academic. He said, ?I'm very smart. I have a PhD. I have a Nobel Prize. If I don't know anything, how can anybody else know anything?? He never read anything. He never had a course in accounting. I would say the vast majority of people in the common stock business do not read documents.
Q: You said you do not take market risk. In a distressed business, can it[the company] run out of oxygen?
A: Very rarely. You have the case of Winstar, which run out of administrative expenses (Ed. Note: Winstar eventually got bought out by IDT for about one penny on the dollar) In most cases, the bank debts are reinstated, the junior debts are converted into equity and the old common stockholders will be wiped out. Sometimes, they go bankrupt again. It's called Chapter 22. We have a high strikeout ratio. It's not easy.
Q: Do you have any value buys recently?
A: We bought 2 million shares of Pfizer at 21. It's at 10 times P/E for a business that normally sells for 20 times. But we did not buy Merck because of the potential liabilities.
Q: Why do you have four funds, instead of just one?
A: We are investor oriented. Reason we have it is to track 3 managers besides myself. Mike Winer knows 10x about real estate as I do. Reason we have it is management. We have attracted the managers to run these funds.
Q: Did you say General Motors will go bankrupt?
A: Let me go through General Motors. I cannot see how they can solve problems outside of Chapter 11. They must unload pension plans, contracts, etc. There is some 30 billion of public debt. It?s very hard to see how they can get the bondholders to do a voluntary exchange. The reason: you have to show the bondholder some downside if he does not exchange. The bonds all have equitable and ratable clauses. I really don?t see how they can solve outside Chapter 11. But I want to add something else. For a company as big as GM with so many profitable businesses [segments], there will be recognizable pressure to preserve value for some of the equity. I have been known to be wrong. [laughter]
Q: I am a value investor and I own Berkshire Hathaway. I have yet to meet a value investor who thinks gold stocks are plays of any kind. What is your view of gold stocks?
A: I plead ignorance.
Q: Which funds are closed?
A: Real Estate and International are closed because we can't find opportunities to deploy the cash. Otherwise, we would open it. I mean we are a profitable business as I told you. [laughter]. In money management, bigger is always better, but my family and I have over 100 million in the funds. Between managing the funds as well as we can and raising fees, where do you think my heart is? If we find opportunities, we?ll open them again.
Q: Have you considered shorting? We have private accounts that short.
A: I don't. In shorts, you have to be cognizant of market risks. A few years ago, we had a scheme to short par bonds which were selling above the call price. The downside would be limited. Can you believe it? I cannot pull the trigger with my own money.
Q: Can you recommend ways on how to appraise management?
A: Read documents, study the compensation, options, financial statements, etc. Depreciation methods, etc. You look at 10-k, 10-q, 8-k, annual reports, president's
letter, quarterly letters.
Q: Can you comment on GMAC?
A: I'm not going to say guarantees. We've been buying GMACs at 10-11% yield. I will say, You're never going to miss a payment. When GM files, GM creditors will make a claim for substantive consolidation. I think only 1 in 100 chance such a claim will be sustained. We are also principal creditors of USG [where this substantive consolidation issue was brought up during the asbestos issues]. I think the same will happen with GMAC. I feel strongly about it.
Q: What are some of the values abroad?
A: Recent purchases were: Cheung Kong Holding, the controlling shareholder of Hutchison Whampoa, Henderson Land, Guoco Group, Posco Steel, Investor AB in Sweden.
Q: Do you look at any telecom stocks?
A: We may invest in equipment manufacturers, having done nothing lately. Carriers scare me. My investments in high tech in general with cash positions exceeding all liabilities, is less than 2x book, less than 10x peak earnings. Our record at best has been mediocre. Like a first stage venture capitalist, we have a big strike out ratio.
Q: Why don?t you start a bond fund? TAV does bonds.
A: When we do distress, we want to be a control investor. TAV can put 1 billion in GM for example. I don't think we'll have ability to raise that kind of money, outside of TAV, for a bond fund. And we have no interest in being a market player, my head will be handed to me. It?s a very confrontational business.
Q: Is there such a thing as too big to fail ? Lockheed, Chrysler?
A: I think there is such a thing as too big to be liquidated, but not too big to be reorganized. In the past, cases like Public Service of New Hampshire or Chrysler, the common idea was if they went bankrupt, they would turn off the lights, or they would stop operating. People are now discovering that's not the case. ?Too big not to be reorganized.? ? that?s what I think, anyway.
Q: Do you and your managers agree within 10% of [intrinsic] value?
A: I doubt it. (Pooh: ??)
Q: The NAV of Third Avenue Value Fund dropped from 60 to 50. What happened?
A: We went ex-dividend. We were involved with Eddie Lampert in the reorganization of Kmart. We had a cost basis of 10 in Kmart which went up to the 160s. We sold not because I don't have a lot of confidence in Eddie, but at 164, will Kmart beat Walmart and Target? I am not so sure. One of the disadvantages with foreign issuers, things like Toyota Industries, Investor AB, etc to U.S. taxpayers. They are PFICs (Passive Foreign Investment Companies), taxed each year as ordinary income on the unrealized appreciation. That was really tax inefficient.
Q: Where is the market going?
A: I don't have a clue. We're market neutral. Most people are very worried about the economy. They are living in 1930s, not the 21st century. Virtually every American Industry has gone through depression almost as bad as the depression: real estate, steel, banks, paper, etc . It has been 50 years now, without domino effect. It changed since 1930s. I suspect to continue, so worry about bottom up, not the stock market, etc.
Q: Others have said Eddie Lampert is the next Warren Buffett ?
A: I will sign off on that. He?s very talented. Now, nobody's perfect. Even Warren did USAir. But Eddie?s certainly done a wonderful job so far.
#426
Отправлено 17.01.2006, 11:00:41
Dimkaumnik
-
- В доску свой
- 1 672 сообщений
How did he get 10 times P/E ???
FP/E probably
Q: Do you and your managers agree within 10% of [intrinsic] value?
A: I doubt it. (Pooh: ??)
Разлет оценки стоимости компании порой может быть весьма значительным.
Even Warren did USAir (с) Whitman
Сообщение отредактировал Dimkaumnik: 17.01.2006, 11:43:32
#432
Отправлено 18.01.2006, 22:17:35
Pooh
-
- В доску свой
- 1 898 сообщений
Free Morningstar reports (MSFT, JNJ, etc):
http://www.morningstar.com/barrons1
or
http://www.morningstar.com/barrons2
http://www.morningstar.com/barrons1
or
http://www.morningstar.com/barrons2
#434
Отправлено 19.01.2006, 15:09:11
Dimkaumnik
-
- В доску свой
- 1 672 сообщений
Google gains ground on Baidu in China: study
http://biz.yahoo.com...oogle.html?.v=1
Начало заката BIDU?
http://biz.yahoo.com...oogle.html?.v=1
Начало заката BIDU?
#435
Отправлено 19.01.2006, 21:41:23
Pooh
-
- В доску свой
- 1 898 сообщений
У меня обычно правило не рассматривать убыточные компании вообще. Но не знаю могут ли быть исключения, например OSTK. У кого какие мысли?
Пара интересных ссылок по OSTK:
http://www.gannononi...verstock_1.html
http://groups.msn.co...D_Message=18154
Также я до сих пор разбираюсь во всем сыр-боре с naked shorting issue, нет времени на все Кто что думает насчет naked shorts?
Пара интересных ссылок по OSTK:
http://www.gannononi...verstock_1.html
http://groups.msn.co...D_Message=18154
Также я до сих пор разбираюсь во всем сыр-боре с naked shorting issue, нет времени на все
Кто что думает насчет naked shorts?
#438
Отправлено 23.01.2006, 23:35:49
Pooh
-
- В доску свой
- 1 898 сообщений
Technical Analysis and Value Investing
http://nodoodahs.blo...-investing.html
-------------
Bill Miller sees higher value in Google
http://money.cnn.com...on=money_latest
http://nodoodahs.blo...-investing.html
I think that the most successful investors exhibit the following attributes:
-open mindedness
-humility
-discipline
-adaptability
I chuckle inside when I meet professionals who pitch their way as the only way. Schwager wrote "there are about a million ways to make money in the markets, the irony is that they are all very difficult to find." Being open minded can save alot of money in the long run.
-------------
Bill Miller sees higher value in Google
http://money.cnn.com...on=money_latest
#439
Отправлено 25.01.2006, 03:04:50
Pooh
-
- В доску свой
- 1 898 сообщений
http://www.olsteinfu...stein10book.pdf
1. Try not to be right all of the time. Investors who want instantaneous gratification in the stock market are usually not right ?over time.?
2. Look at the downside risk of any stock before evaluating upside potential. Long-term performers are those who make the fewest errors.
3. Define risk according to financial strength, excess cash flow and predictability of cash flow based on unique fundamentals, rather than defining risk by the volatility of a company?s stock.
4. Do not buy good companies at ridiculous prices. The price one pays for good companies is just as important as separating good companies from mediocre ones.
5. Do not try to time value. The timing is the value itself. There are too many smart and educated investors for true value to not be eventually recognized.
6. Have patience. Value is usually found during periods of negative psychology or misperception. These periods usually last longer than one expects.
7. Do not value companies relative to other companies. The value of a company comes from comparing the cash flow return to low risk three-year US Treasury Notes.
8. Do not judge value by previous prices. Just because an overpriced company has fallen does not mean it is cheap.
9. Do not interview management. They are biased. Form your own opinion of management from an inferential analysis of a company?s financial statements and the veracity of previous shareholder letters.
10. Do not set up artificial barriers to investing such as large cap, small cap, cyclical, growth etc. Growth is a component of value. An investor should not pick a physician by his height, and an investor should not pick a company by its size.
11. Do not predict interest rates; react to them.
12. Understand the accounting of companies you own.
13. Never keep an overvalued stock for tax reasons.
14. Do not own a sector fund. Pick managers who move to the right sectors based on valuation.
15. Do not own an index fund. An index fund was a great idea that is seriously flawed now because of overuse.
1. Try not to be right all of the time. Investors who want instantaneous gratification in the stock market are usually not right ?over time.?
2. Look at the downside risk of any stock before evaluating upside potential. Long-term performers are those who make the fewest errors.
3. Define risk according to financial strength, excess cash flow and predictability of cash flow based on unique fundamentals, rather than defining risk by the volatility of a company?s stock.
4. Do not buy good companies at ridiculous prices. The price one pays for good companies is just as important as separating good companies from mediocre ones.
5. Do not try to time value. The timing is the value itself. There are too many smart and educated investors for true value to not be eventually recognized.
6. Have patience. Value is usually found during periods of negative psychology or misperception. These periods usually last longer than one expects.
7. Do not value companies relative to other companies. The value of a company comes from comparing the cash flow return to low risk three-year US Treasury Notes.
8. Do not judge value by previous prices. Just because an overpriced company has fallen does not mean it is cheap.
9. Do not interview management. They are biased. Form your own opinion of management from an inferential analysis of a company?s financial statements and the veracity of previous shareholder letters.
10. Do not set up artificial barriers to investing such as large cap, small cap, cyclical, growth etc. Growth is a component of value. An investor should not pick a physician by his height, and an investor should not pick a company by its size.
11. Do not predict interest rates; react to them.
12. Understand the accounting of companies you own.
13. Never keep an overvalued stock for tax reasons.
14. Do not own a sector fund. Pick managers who move to the right sectors based on valuation.
15. Do not own an index fund. An index fund was a great idea that is seriously flawed now because of overuse.
#440
Отправлено 26.01.2006, 08:36:39
Pooh
-
- В доску свой
- 1 898 сообщений
http://groups.msn.co...557570909444963
I read Marc Faber's comments in the most recent Barron's about a gradual wealth transfer underway from the US to emerging Asia. He quoted Ray Dalio [founder of Bridgewater Associates] who recently wrote, "The current shift in wealth from the U.S. is unprecedented and will go down in history as one of the great financial events." In the interview, Faber concludes "you have to emphasize international investments, largely in Asia. To give you an example, the market cap today of GM is $12 billion, Ford is $15 billion, Honda is $55 billion and Toyota is $172 billion. In 1970, IBM alone had a bigger market cap than the entire Japanese stock market. Over the next 10-20 years Asian markets, including Japan, could have 25% to possibly 50% of the world market cap, from 14% currently."
As a portfolio manager focusing on North American equities, I found Faber's comments to be both thought provoking and disturbing. What he is saying makes a lot of sense to me, and I don't want to wake up in 5, 10, 15 or 20 years to the realization that I did not act on such an obvious trend. So, what to do?
Thus far, I have invested in multinationals to gain exposure to growing markets abroad. Admittedly, this is a very diluted way to particpate. As I see it, my other options are a) outsource a portion of assets to another active manager who focuses on Asia, b) invest in low fee index funds or ETFs, or c) invest in a holding company whose business it is to make investments in the region. The latter option would be the most pleasing to me if I could find the right company, run by the right person and at the right price.
So my question to the board is who are the great investors/ capital allocators in Asia today, and which of these people has publicly traded holding companies? Alternatively are there sleepy holding companies like some of the old gems (think Canadian Pacific) that we had here in Canada?
I read Marc Faber's comments in the most recent Barron's about a gradual wealth transfer underway from the US to emerging Asia. He quoted Ray Dalio [founder of Bridgewater Associates] who recently wrote, "The current shift in wealth from the U.S. is unprecedented and will go down in history as one of the great financial events." In the interview, Faber concludes "you have to emphasize international investments, largely in Asia. To give you an example, the market cap today of GM is $12 billion, Ford is $15 billion, Honda is $55 billion and Toyota is $172 billion. In 1970, IBM alone had a bigger market cap than the entire Japanese stock market. Over the next 10-20 years Asian markets, including Japan, could have 25% to possibly 50% of the world market cap, from 14% currently."
As a portfolio manager focusing on North American equities, I found Faber's comments to be both thought provoking and disturbing. What he is saying makes a lot of sense to me, and I don't want to wake up in 5, 10, 15 or 20 years to the realization that I did not act on such an obvious trend. So, what to do?
Thus far, I have invested in multinationals to gain exposure to growing markets abroad. Admittedly, this is a very diluted way to particpate. As I see it, my other options are a) outsource a portion of assets to another active manager who focuses on Asia, b) invest in low fee index funds or ETFs, or c) invest in a holding company whose business it is to make investments in the region. The latter option would be the most pleasing to me if I could find the right company, run by the right person and at the right price.
So my question to the board is who are the great investors/ capital allocators in Asia today, and which of these people has publicly traded holding companies? Alternatively are there sleepy holding companies like some of the old gems (think Canadian Pacific) that we had here in Canada?
Количество пользователей, читающих эту тему: 1
пользователей: 0, неизвестных прохожих: 1, скрытых пользователей: 0
